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Abstract Taking batch image encryption into account, the existing single-image encryption schemes
suffer from either high computational cost or image size expansion, which worsens when it is a batch
of images to encrypt. This paper proposes a novel encryption scheme based on chaining random grids,
suitable for dealing with batch binary, grey-level, and color images. Compared with the existing random-
grid-based encryption schemes, our method encoded m images into m + 1 total random cipher-grids,
rather than 2m cipher-grids encoded by existing encryption schemes. The decryption process is done by a
human visual system and no computation is required. This method requires neither extra pixel expansion
nor any encoding basis matrix, which are required and unavoidable for accustomed visual cryptography.
Structured analysis and discussion about quality and secrets are performed, and the effectiveness of the
method is shown in experimental results.
© 2013 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In the past decade, multimedia techniques have progressed
rapidly in industry and academia, and, in particular, photo-
graphic devices like digital cameras and digital video recorders,
etc., are regarded as daily essential items. People capture many
more images or video frames than before, which they usually
share with others via e-mail, online photo printing services, or
blogs via batch-of-image transmission over public networks. In
order to protect the security of images transmitted over pub-
lic networks, image encryption [1,2], authentication [3], hiding
[4,5], and watermarking [6,7] are necessary.
Intuitively, to keep digital images secret, cryptographic tools
like DES, AES, and RSA [8] are well-defined to deal with
confidentiality. However, since image sizes are much larger
than those of text, it is usually not efficient to encrypt them
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scient.2013.05.003using traditional cryptosystems, especially for lightweight
mobile devices.
In 1987, Kafri and Keren [9] presented an image encryption
scheme of pictures and shapes with random grids to encrypt
the binary secret image into two meaningless random grids.
First, a two-dimension array (called a random grid) of image
pixels is generated randomly, in which each element is either
fully transparent (‘‘0’’) or totally opaque (‘‘1’’). Accordingly, the
second one is obtained. When two random grids are stacked,
the information of the secret image is visually recognizable by
the human visual system.
In a similar way, Naor and Shamir [10] presented a visual
cryptography scheme (or called visual secret sharing) to encrypt
a binary image into two meaningless share images, in which
the image can be decrypted by stacking later. In visual
cryptography, there are two basicmatrices, S0 and S1, to encode
a secret binary image, B. The basic matrices are shown as
follows:
S0 =

0 1
0 1

and S1 =

0 1
1 0

.
Each pixel in B is encoded into two share images, while
its expansion is 2. If the pixel in B is white, the subpixels of
two shares are assigned as [0 1] and [0 1], respectively; if the
pixel is black, they are [0 1] and [1 0], respectively. So far,
research [10–18] has been continually proposed to avoid pixel
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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address the problem, wherein decoding highly depends on the
precise alignment of transparencies by hand, a misalignment
tolerant visual cryptography scheme [1] has been presented,
such that it is not always necessary to align the transparencies
precisely.
Inspired by [10], Lukac andPlataniotis [19] proposed another
image encryption scheme. Likewise, Shyu [20] extended the
random grid technique [9] to encrypt a binary, grey-level
or color image into two random grids. However, Kafri and
Keren, and Shyu schemes are 2-out-of-2 cases. In 2006, Pareek
et al. [21] proposed a symmetric key block cipher using
multiple one-dimensional chaotic maps. Unlike most existing
chaotic ciphers, in the ciphers of Pareek et al., the initial
conditions and/or the control parameters are not used as
secret keys, but derived from an external key instead, with
the goal of obtaining a new way to achieve a higher level of
security. Wei et al. [22] further proposed a remedy to improve
the security of the original cipher against known-plaintext
attacks. However, Chengqing Li et al. [23] reports some of
their findings on the security problems of this kind of chaotic
cipher:
(1) A number of weak keys exist;
(2) Some important intermediate data of the cipher are not
sufficiently random;
(3) The whole secret key can be broken by a known-plaintext
attack with only 120 consecutive known plain-bytes in one
known plaintext.
More discussion about the security problems of chaotic
ciphers can be found in [24]. In 2008, Shyu [25] and Chen
and Tsao [26] further proposed the enhanced version to
encrypt the secret into n (n ≥ 2) cipher-grids without pixel
expansion and additional codebook redesign.
This existing research neglects the fact that people usually
distribute digital images by batch transmission, e.g., a user
intends to share m batch images of security-sensitivity with a
group of participants through the public Internet. In the above-
mentioned random-grid-based or visual-cryptography-based
encryption schemes, thesem images have been turned into 2m
cipher-images. They are not adequate solutions to encrypting
a large number of images at once, or they only can deal with
binary secret images, or have pixel expansion problems, or need
extra codebooks, and so on. Thus, these problems are challenges
in the field of image encryption, and the proposed method
solves them.
This paper proposes image encryption algorithms to en-
crypt a large number of images, in which the m images are
encoded into only m + 1 cipher-grids, rather than 2m. We
facilitate the new technique of chaining random grids to en-
crypt a batch of images. An efficient decryption, directly su-
perimposing random grids by a human visual system, profits
by extremely low computational cost and simple hardware.
Other valuable advantages are worthwhile highlighting, as
follows. Firstly, compared with visual-cryptography-based
encryption schemes [10,19], the proposed schemes need
neither the predefined codebook (matrices) nor pixel expan-
sion, i.e. they save storage or bandwidth to deliver cipher-
images. Secondly, in contrast to random-grid-based encryp-
tion schemes [9,10,19,20,27,28], the proposed schemes only
need about one half of the storage and bandwidth of cipher-
images when the number of images to encrypt is large. Thirdly,compared with traditional encryption schemes, such as DES,
AES, and RSA [8] or chaos encryption systems [21,22,29–35],
the encryption/decryption process of the proposed scheme
is extremely efficient, especially in the decryption phase.
Fourthly, our method can deal with binary, grey-level and color
secret images. However, this ability is better than some tradi-
tional encryption schemes that can handle only binary secret
images [9,10,27,28]. Hence, our scheme is suitable for low com-
putational capability in client–server environments, and the
effectiveness and comparisons are shown in the experiment
results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Kafri and
Keren’s image encryptionwith randomgrids is briefly reviewed
in the next section. The present batch image encryption
methods with chaining random grids are proposed in Section 3.
The experimental results and discussions are shown in
Section 4, and, finally, the conclusions are in Section 5.
2. Review of image encryption by random grids
In 1987, Kafri and Keren [9] presented an encryption
scheme of pictures and shapes with random grids. The random
grid technique is used to encrypt the binary secret image
into another two meaningless random grids. The shape or
information of the secret image is visually recognizable by their
superimposition.
2.1. Three algorithms by random grids
Prior to demonstrating the proposed schemes, we introduce
those proposed by Kafri and Keren, who randomly generated a
two-dimensional array (called a random grid) of image pixels,
in which each element is either fullly transparent (‘‘0’’) or
totally opaque (‘‘1’’). Then Kafri and Keren brought up three
different algorithms with random grids to encrypt binary
images. Suppose that a binary image, B, of size w × h pixels is
encrypted into two random grids, R1 and R2, with the same size.
These algorithms are described below.
Input: A binary secret image
B = {B[i, j]|B[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w and 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
Output: Two random grids R1 and R2 which reveal Bwhen
superimposed where R1 = {R1[i, j]|R1[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}} and
R2 = {R2[i, j]|R2[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w and 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
Algorithm 1
// Generate R1 as a random grid
for (each pixel R1[i, j]) do
R1[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
// Encode the second random grid R2
for (each pixel R2[i, j]) do
{ if B[i, j] = 0
R2[i, j] = R1[i, j] // equivalent
else
R2[i, j] = R1[i, j] //complement
}
output (R1, R2)
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// Generate R1 as a random grid
for (each pixel R1[i, j]) do
R1[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
// Encode the second random grid R2
for (each pixel R2[i, j]) do
{ if B[i, j] = 0
R2[i, j] = R1[i, j] // equivalent
else
R2[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
}
output (R1, R2)
Algorithm 3
10 // Generate R1 as a random grid
20 for (each pixel R1[i, j]) do
30 R1[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
40 // Encode the second random grid R2
50 for (each pixel R2[i, j]) do
60 { if B[i, j] = 0
70 R2[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
80 else
90 R2[i, j] = R1[i, j] // complement
100}
110 output (R1, R2)
Note that the function ramdom_pixel(0, 1) returns a binary
value, 0 or 1, to represent a transparent or opaque pixel,
respectively, by a coin-flip procedure, and R1[i, j] means the
inverse of R1[i, j]. Because there is no secret key needed to
encode the secret image for visual secret sharing (VSS), and all
ciphered images are transferred to certain participants through
the public environment such as Internet, in the decryption
phase, two random grids, R1 and R2, are directly superimposed
to form a stacked image, S, recognized by the human visual
system. Themain advantage of Kafri andKeren’s schemes is that
they do not suffer from pixel expansion like traditional visual
cryptography.
2.2. Analysis of Kafri and Keren’s schemes
To demonstrate the feasibility of Kafri and Keren’s algo-
rithms, we emphasize security and quality as the main require-
ments of random grid image encryption. In order to explain
the security and quality of their algorithms, we firstly illustrate
some definitions.
Definition 1 (Light Transmission). For a certain grid pixel, r , in
a random grid, R, the light transmission of a transparent (resp.
opaque) pixel is defined as t(r) = 1 (resp. 0).
Definition 2 (Average Light Transmission). For a certain grid,
R = {ri|ri is transparent or opaque, i = 0, 1, . . . , n}, the average
light transmission of R, denoted as T (R), is defined as:
T (R) = 1
n
n
i=1
t(ri).Table 1: The results of the superimposing two random grid pixels.
r1 r2 r1 ⊕ r2
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
Lemma 1. The expected value of the average light transmission in
a random grid, R, is 1/2, i.e., T (R) = 1/2.
Proof. A random grid is defined as the number of transparent
and opaque pixels which are probabilistically the same, i.e.
Prob(r = 0) = Prob(r = 1) = 1/2. The expected value of
the light transmission, t(r), is 1/2. That is, the expected value
of the average light transmission of a random grid, R, is 1/2, i.e.
T (R) = 1/2 based on Definition 2. 
Lemma 2. The operation of stacking is represented as⊕, which is
the bit-wise OR operation to satisfy the following properties.
(a) The average light transmission in a superimposed grid of two
identical random grids, i.e. R⊕ R, is 1/2. That is, T (R⊕ R) =
1/2.
(b) The average light transmission in a superimposed grid by
two randomly generated grids, i.e. R1 ⊕ R2, is 1/4. That is,
T (R1 ⊕ R2) = 1/4.
(c) The average light transmission by superimposing two inverse
random grids, i.e. R¯⊕ R, is 0. In other words, T (R¯⊕ R) = 0.
Proof. Two identical random grids, R and R, are superimposed,
and the result is still the same as R. Hence, the expected value of
the average light transmission, T (R ⊕ R) = T (R), is 1/2, based
on Lemma 1.
Let R1 and R2 be two different grids, randomly generated, of
the same size. R1 and R2 being superimposed, the results are
shown in Table 1. That is:
T (R1 ⊕ R2) = 1n
n
i=1
t(r1,i ⊕ r2,i) = 1/4.
Let R¯ be the inverse randomgrid of R, r¯ ∈ R¯ being the inverse
grid pixel of r ∈ R. It is obvious that r¯⊕ r = 1 and t(r¯⊕ r) = 0.
That is:
T (R¯⊕ R) = 1
n
n
i=1
t(r¯i ⊕ ri) = 0. 
For simplicity, let B(0) (resp. B(1)) be the area of all
transparent (resp. opaque) pixels in the binary image, B, where
B = B(0) ∪ B(1) and B(0) ∩ B(1) = ∅. Therefore, the area of
pixels in stacked image, S, corresponding to B(0) (resp. B(1))
denotes S[B(0)] (resp. S[B(1)]). That is: S = S[B(0)] ∪ S[B(1)]
and S[B(0)] ∩ S[B(1)] = ∅. Likewise, R[B(0)] and R[B(1)] are
defined.
Since the human visual system is used to extract the secret
images, the contrast of the stacked secret image plays a critical
role in guaranteeing that it is visually recognized as the exact
secretmessage, that is, the contrast value defined inDefinition 3
must be greater than 0. The ‘‘contrast’’ insists that the light
transmission of S[B(0)] should be greater than that of S[B(1)],
such that the areas of white and black pixels in B can be visually
distinguished (or the information of B can be seen) from S. The
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determines the contrast of stacking the transparencies, thus,
shall be as high as possible. Consequently, Definition 3 offers
the contrast.
Definition 3 (Contrast). The contrast of the stacked image, S,
with respect to the secret image, B, is defined as:
α = T (S[B(0)])− T (S[B(1)])
1+ T (S[B(1)]) ,
where α ≥ 0. If α = 0, it means that S is visually meaningless,
otherwise, the larger value of αmeans that the correct secret is
visually recognized [13–15].
Thus, the reconstructed image, S, is visually recognizable, in
the sense that its contrast is greater than or equal to a threshold
value (greater than 0).
The algorithms based on random grids must satisfy the
following theorems. For simplicity, only Algorithm 3 is taken
for an example.
Theorem 1 (Security). Each random grid, R1 or R2, alone, reveals
no information of the secret B, i.e., R1 and R2 are visually
meaningless in Algorithm 3 .
Proof. Let r1 (resp. r2) be one random grid pixel of R1 (resp. R2)
and b be one pixel of B. In the random grid, R1, as shown in line
30 of Algorithm 3, the value of ‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’ is randomly generated
by a coin-flip function. The average light transmission of the
corresponding area in R1, with respect to the white (resp.
black) area in the secret image, B, is T (R1[B(0)]) = 1/2
(resp. T (R1[B(1)]) = 1/2). With R1 alone, the contrast of
R1 is:
α = T (R1[B(0)])− T (R1[B(1)])
1+ T (R1[B(1)]) =
1
2 − 12
1+ 12
= 0.
By Definition 3, R1 is visually meaningless because the
contrast is 0.
In the random grid, R2, as shown in line 70 of Algorithm 3,
prob(r2 = 0|b = 0) = prob(r2 = 1|b = 0) = 1/2. The
expected value of the light transmission, T (R2[B(0)]), is 1/2.
As shown in line 90 of Algorithm 3, prob(r2 = r¯1|b = 1).
However, prob(r1 = 0) = prob(r1 = 1) = 1/2, so that
prob(r2 = 0|b = 1) = prob(r2 = 1|b = 1) = 1/2. The
expected value of the light transmission, T (R2[B(1)]), is 1/2.
With R2 alone, the contrast of R2 is:
α = T (R2[B(0)])− T (R2[B(1)])
1+ T (R2[B(1)]) =
1
2 − 12
1+ 12
= 0.
By Definition 3, R1 is visually meaningless because the
contrast is 0.
To sum up, each random grid, R1 or R2, alone, reveals no
information of the secret. 
Theorem 2 (Quality). The quality of the stacked image, S,
by superimposing R1 and R2, using Algorithm 3, must be
acceptable to be visually recognizable by human beings. That is,
α > 0.
Proof. If R1 and R2 are stacked to form S, S[B(0)] = R1[B(0)] ⊕
R2[B(0)] and S[B(1)] = R1[B(1)] ⊕ R2[B(1)].
First, according to lines 30 and 70 of Algorithm 3, both R1
and R2 are randomly generated under the case of B(0). From
Lemma 2(b), i.e., T (R1 ⊕ R2) = 1/4, T (R1[B(0)] ⊕ R2[B(0)]) =
1/4 is obtained. Thus, T (S[B(0)]) = T (R1[B(0)] ⊕ R2[B(0)]) =
1/4.Table 2: The average light transmission and the contrast in stacked images.
T (S[B(0)]) T (S[B(1)]) α
Algorithm 1 1/2 0 1/2
Algorithm 2 1/2 1/4 1/5
Algorithm 3 1/4 0 1/4
Figure 1: Image encryption with chaining random grids.
Second, based on line 90 of Algorithm 3, R1 and R2 are inverse
under the case of B(1). From Lemma 2(c), i.e., T (R1 ⊕ R2) = 0,
T (R1[B(1)] ⊕ R2[B(1)]) = 0 is obtained. Thus, T (S[B(1)]) =
T (R1[B(1)] ⊕ R2[B(1)]) = T (R1[B(1)] ⊕ R1[B(1)]) = 0.
The contrast α = T (S[B(0)])−T (S[B(1)])1+T (S[B(1)]) =
1
4−0
1+0 = 14 > 0.
The quality of the stacked image, S, is acceptable to be visually
recognizable by the human visual system, because the contrast
is greater than 0. 
Hence, no information of the secret image, B, would be
revealed from R1 and R2, individually. On the other hand, the
secret image, B, can be recognizable from S. The average light
transmission in stacked image S is shown in Table 2.
3. Proposed methods
This section proposes a batch image encryption algorithm
based on chaining random grids. This method of chaining
random grids applies the encryption concept of Kafri and Keren
to encrypt m images and then generate m + 1 cipher-grids.
The encryption process is shown in Figure 1. The random grids
technology, used to encrypt the first binary image, generates
the first two cipher-grids. Then, one cipher-grid generates
the third cipher-grid for encrypting the second binary image.
In the same way, the third cipher-grid is used to encrypt
the third binary image to generate the fourth cipher-grid.
The same process is repeated until the last binary image is
encrypted.
All generated cipher-grids are dispatched to all partici-
pants, respectively; none can be used to disclose secrets. All
secrets can be disclosed only if all cipher-grids are gathered
again.
3.1. Batch image encryption scheme for binary images
Given a set of m binary images, Xp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m) with
size of w × h pixels, the first random grid, R0, is randomly
generated as one cipher-grid of a secret image, X1. Later, R1 is
further generated based on R0 and X1 regarded as one cipher-
grid of the next secret image, X2. Without loss of generality,
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Algorithm 3 is taken as an example to demonstrate the
proposed schemes. The batch encryption process is described
in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Batch encryption of binary images
Input: A set of binary secret images
Xp = {Xp[i, j]|Xp[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and
1 ≤ p ≤ m.
Output:m+ 1 cipher-grids,
Rq = {Rq[i, j]|Rq[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and
0 ≤ q ≤ m.
10 //Generate the first cipher-grid R0
20 for (each pixel R0[i, j]) do
30 R0[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
40 //Encode the cipher-grids from R1 to Rm
50 for (each pixel Rq[i, j]) do
60 { If Xq[i, j] = 0
70 Rq[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
80 else
90 Rq[i, j] = Rq−1[i, j] //complement
100 }
110 output R0, R1, . . . , Rm,m+ 1 cipher-grids.
The decryption phase is simply superimposing two corre-
sponding cipher-grids, i.e., Sp = Rp−1 ⊕ Rp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m),
to be recovered by a human visual system (Figure 2). Using a
computer to recover the secrets, the decryption algorithm is de-
scribed in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Batch decryption of binary images
Input:m+ 1 cipher-grids
Rq = {Rq[i, j]|Rq[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and
0 ≤ q ≤ m.
Output:m superimposing images
Sp = {Sp[i, j]|Sp[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and
1 ≤ p ≤ m.
//Superimposing cipher-grids
forp = 1 to m
Sp = Rp−1 ⊕ Rp //⊕ is bit-wise OR operation
Lemma 3. Each cipher-grid of R0, R1, . . . , Rm, is a random
grid.
Proof. Let ri be one cipher-grid pixel of Ri, and bi be one pixel
of Xi. As demonstrated in line 30 of Algorithm 4, the value of
‘‘0’’ or ‘‘1’’ is randomly generated by a coin-flip function. The
average light transmission of the corresponding area in R0, with
respect to the white (resp. black) area in the secret image X1, is
T (R0[X1(0)]) = 1/2 (resp. T (R0[X1(1)]) = 1/2). With R0 alone,
the contrast α of R0 is:α = T (R0[X1(0)])− T (R0[X1(1)])
1+ T (R0[X1(0)]) =
1
2 − 12
1+ 12
= 0.
By Definition 3, R0 is visually meaningless (the contrast is 0).
To generate the second cipher-grid, R1, according to R0 and
X1 (see the relationship of R0, R1 and X1 shown in Figure 1),
the operations in lines 50–90 of Algorithm 4 are performed.
As the proof in Theorem 1, we get the expected values
of the light transmission, T (R1[X1(0)]) and T (R1[X1(1)]), as
1/2. By Definition 3, R1 is visually meaningless (the contrast
is 0).
The processes in lines 50–90 are repeated to generate the other
cipher-grid Ri, based on Ri−1 and Xi, where i = 2, 3, . . . ,m.
Hence, the expected value of the average light transmission,
T (Ri[Xi(0)]) and T (Ri[Xi(1)]), is 1/2. By Definition 3, Ri
is visually meaningless (the contrast is 0). That is, all
cipher-grids, R0, R1, . . . , Rm, are all random grids (visually
meaningless). 
Theorem 3 (Security). The proposed scheme in Algorithm 4 is as
secure as Kafri and Keren’s random grid schemes in Algorithm 3.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, each cipher-grid of R0, R1, . . . ,
Rm, is proven as a random grid because the contrast of Ri is 0,
therefore, each random grid alone reveals no information of the
secrets. That is, the proposed scheme in Algorithm 4 is as secure
as Kafri and Keren’s random grid schemes in Algorithm 3. 
It is well-known that a cryptanalytic attack is known
by relying on assumptions of how many samples can be
observed and how an encryption algorithm works. In practice,
let us assume attackers do know the encryption algorithm.
Accordingly, the following three types of cryptanalytic attack
are discussed:
(1) Cipher-grid-only attacks: Attackers can obtain only cipher
grids which are used to break the image encryption
scheme accordingly. It is the most common attack in
cryptosystems.
(2) Chosen-plainimage attacks: Attackers, aiming to determine
the key used for encryption, can break the image encryption
easily and fast if they can choose any plainimage they like,
encrypted with the unknown key. The chosen-plainimage
attack will be very meaningful if the same key is used to
encrypt more than one image, especially if a large number
of images are all encrypted with a key.
(3) Kown-plainimage attacks: Suppose that the legal user
encrypts all plainimages into corresponding cipher-grids
by an identical key, attackers may break the cryptosystem
easily. If the attacker obtains certain pairs of plainimages
and cipher-grids, he has clues by analyzing these pairs to
deduce the secret key.
Remark 1. The proposed scheme in Algorithm 4 is secure
against cipher-grid-only attacks.
Proof. By Theorem 3, each random grid, Rq, alone, reveals
no information of the secrets. Therefore, it is easy to prove
that attackers have no feasible way to break the proposed
scheme. 
Remark 2. The proposed scheme in Algorithm 4 is secure
against chosen-plainimage attacks.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, the first random grid, R0,
is randomly generated as one cipher-grid. This implies that
even if the same secret image is encrypted by the proposed
scheme, the generated cipher-grids are independent. Thus,
chosen-plainimage attacks are impractical. 
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in Algorithm 4.
T (Sp[B(0)]) T (Sp[B(1)]) α
Algorithm 4 based on Algorithm 1 1/2 0 1/2
Algorithm 4 based on Algorithm 2 1/2 1/4 1/5
Algorithm 4 based on Algorithm 3 1/4 0 1/4
Remark 3. The proposed scheme in Algorithm 4 is secure
against known-plainimage attacks.
Proof. By the same reason mentioned in Remark 2, known-
plainimage attacks are impractical in the proposed scheme. 
Theorem 4 (Quality). The contrast of the proposed scheme
in Algorithm 5 is the same as that of Kafri and Keren’s correspond-
ing random grid schemes. Thus, the quality of all stacked images,
Sp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m), is acceptable, so that the secrets are visually
recognizable by the human visual system.
Proof. If Rp−1 and Rp are stacked to form Sp, Sp[Xp(0)] =
Rp−1[Xp(0)] ⊕ Rp[Xp(0)] and Sp[Xp(1)] = Rp−1[Xp(1)] ⊕
Rp[Xp(1)].
First, according to lines 30 and 70 of Algorithm 4, both
Rp−1 and the white area of Rp are randomly generated under
the case of Xp(0). From Lemma 2(b), i.e., T (Rp−1 ⊕ Rp) =
1/4, T (Rp−1[Xp(0)] ⊕ Rp[Xp(0)]) = 1/4 is obtained. Thus,
T (Sp[Xp(0)]) = T (Rp−1[Xp(0)] ⊕ Rp[Xp(0)]) = 1/4.
Second, according to line 90 of Algorithm 4, Rp−1 and the black
area of Rp are inverse under the case of Xp(1). From Lemma 2(c),
T (Rp−1 ⊕ Rp) = 0, T (Rp−1[Xp(1)] ⊕ Rp[Xp(1)]) = 0 is
obtained. Thus, T (Sp[Xp(1)]) = T (Rp−1[Xp(1)] ⊕ Rp[Xp(1)]) =
T (Rp−1[Xp(1)] ⊕ Rp−1[Xp(1)]) = 0.
The contrast αp between Rp−1 and Rp is
T (Sp[Xp(0)])−T (Sp[Xp(1)])
1+T (Sp[Xp(1)]) =
1
4−0
1+0 = 14 > 0 where Sp = Rp−1 ⊕ Rp and p = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The quality of the stacked image, Sp, is acceptable to the human
visual system since the contrast is greater than 0. 
Hence, no information of binary secret images, Xp, would be
revealed from Rp−1 and Rp, individually. On the one hand, the
secret images, Xp, are recognizable from Sp. The average light
transmission and related contrast of the stacked image is shown
in Table 3.
3.2. Batch image encryption scheme for grey-level images
In this subsection, we show themethod of how to extend the
encryption scheme for binary images to encrypt m grey-level
images at once. The halftoning technique [27] is adopted to turn
a set of m grey-level images, Gp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m), with size of
w × h pixels, into m halftone images, HGp, prior to performing
the operations in Algorithm 4 to generate m + 1 random grids
HRq (q = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m).
Detail of the batch encryption process is described in Al-
gorithm 6. Algorithms 4 and 6 differ only in the halfton-
ing operations (lines 10–30) as the preprocessing of the
latter.
Algorithm 6: Batch encryption of grey-level images
Input: A set of grey-level secret images
Gp = {Gp[i, j]|Gp[i, j] ∈ [0, 255]}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
and 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
Output:m+ 1 cipher-grids
HRq = {HRq[i, j]|HRq[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
and 0 ≤ q ≤ m.10 //Halftoning: Turn grey-level images Gp into HGp.
20 for (each grey-level images Gp) do
30 HGp
halftoning←−−−−− Gp
40 //Generate the first cipher-grid HR0
50 for (each pixel of HR0[i, j]) do
60 HR0[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
70 //Encode the cipher-grids form HR1 to HRm
80 for (each pixel of HRq[i, j]) do
90 {if HGq[i, j] = 0
100 HRq[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) //random
110 else
120 HRq[i, j] = HRq−1[i, j] //complement
130 }
140 output HR0,HR1, . . . ,HRm,m+ 1 cipher-grids.
The decryption phase is simply superimposing two corre-
sponding cipher-grids by HSp = HRp−1 ⊕ HRp (p = 1, 2,
. . . ,m) to disclose contents recognizable by the human eye.
While using computers to recover the secrets, the decryption
algorithm is described in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7: Batch decryption of grey-level images
Input:m+ 1 cipher-grids
HRq = {HRq[i, j]|HRq[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
and 0 ≤ q ≤ m.
Output:m superimposing images
HSp = {HSp[i, j]|HSp[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
and 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
//Superimposing cipher-grids
for (each superimposing images HSp) do
HSp = HRp−1 ⊕ HRp //⊕ is bit-wise OR operation
Theorem 5 (Security). The proposed scheme in Algorithm 6 is as
secure as Kafri and Keren’s random grid scheme in Algorithm 3.
Proof. Theorem 3 shows that the proposed Algorithm 6
for grey-level images is as secure as Kafri and Keren’s
random grid scheme by demonstrating T (HR0[HG1(0)]) =
T (HR0[HG1(1)]) = 1/2 and T (HRi[HGi(0)])= T (HRi[HGi(1)])=
1/2, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Obviously, each random grid, HRq, alone
reveals no secret information. 
For the scenario of encrypting grey-level images, the
contrast refers to the visual quality of the stacked result, HSp =
HRp−1 ⊕ HRp. Definition 3 is suitable for analyzing the visual
quality of Algorithm 7.
Theorem 6 (Quality). The contrast of the proposed scheme
in Algorithm 7 is the same as that of Kafri and Keren’s
corresponding random grid scheme. Thus, the quality of all stacked
images, HSp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m), is acceptable for the secrets to be
visually recognizable.
Proof. Based on Theorem 4, it is easy to show that contrast αp,
between HRp−1 and HRp, is
T (HSp[HGp(0)])−T (HSp[HGp(1)])
1+T (HSp[HGp(1)]) =
1
4−0
1+0 =
1
4 > 0, where, HSp = HRp−1 ⊕ HRp and p = 1, 2, . . . ,m. 
3.3. Batch image encryption scheme for color images
Color images are represented depending on the color model,
including the additive model (so-called RGB system) and the
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of the color feature in Ref. [27]. This paper exploits the additive
model, so that colored transparencies are used to carry the color
of random grid pixels with three primary colors: red (R), green
(G), and blue (B).
While extendingKafri andKeren’s scheme to encryptm color
images, Cp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m), at once, the encryption process
consists of five steps:
Step 1: The color images should be decomposed into three
color components, i.e., R, G, and B, say CRp , C
G
p , and C
B
p .
Step 2: Each color component (CRp , C
G
p , and C
B
p ) is turned into a
binary image (HCRp,HC
G
p , and HC
B
p) using the halftoning
technique.
Step 3: The first random grid (CRR0, CR
G
0 , and CR
B
0) of each color
component (CRp , C
G
p , and C
B
p ) is generated using a coin-
flip function.
Step 4: The other m random grid (CRRq, CR
G
q , and CR
B
q) where
q = 1, 2, . . . ,m, is produced by adopting Algorithm 4.
Step 5: Three color components (CRRq, CR
G
q and CR
B
q) are com-
bined to form eight-color cipher-grids, CRq.
Step 6: Finally, all cipher-grids, Cq, are painted onto trans-
parencies in the invert color by a color printer.
If the subtractive color model is adopted, Step 6 is omitted.
The detailed batch encryption process for color images is
described in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8: Batch encryption of color images
Input: A set of color secret images, Cp = {Cp[i, j]|Cp[i, j] =
{CRp [i, j], CGp [i, j], CBp [i, j]|CRp [i, j], CGp [i, j], CBp [i, j] ∈
[0 . . . 255]}}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
Output:m+ 1 cipher-grids CRq = {CRq[i, j]|CRq[i, j] =
{CRRq[i, j], CRGp [i, j], CRBp[i, j]|CRRp[i, j],
CRGp [i, j], CRBp[i, j] ∈ {0, 1}}}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h,
and 0 ≤ q ≤ m.
10 //Image decomposition: turn color images into three
components
20 for (each pixel Cp[i, j])
30 (CRp [i, j], CGp [i, j], CBp [i, j])
color component decomposition←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Cp[i, j]
40 //Halftoning: Turn each component of Cp into HCp
50 for (each pixel Cxp [i, j], x = R,G, B)
60 HCxp[i, j] halftoning←−−−−− Cxp [i, j]
70 //Generate the first cipher-grid CRR0, CR
G
0 , and CR
B
0
80 for (each pixel CRx0[i, j], x = R,G, B) do
90 CRx0[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
100 //Encode the cipher-grids CRxp, x = R,G, B, 1 ≤ p ≤ m
110 for (each pixel CRxp)
110 { if HCxp[i, j] = 0
120 CRxp[i, j] = ramdom_pixel(0, 1) // random
130 else
140 CRxp[i, j] = CRxp−1[i, j]} //complement
150 //Cipher-grids composition
160 for (each pixel CRq[i, j], 0 ≤ q ≤ m) do
170 CRq[i, j] color component composition←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− CRRq[i, j], CRGq [i, j],
CRBq[i, j]
180 outputm+ 1 cipher-grids CRqThe decryption phase is simply superimposing two corre-
sponding cipher-grids, CSp = CRp−1 ⊕ CRp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m)
to disclose the content to the human visual system. While us-
ing computers to recover the secrets, the decryption algorithm
is illustrated in Algorithm 9. Here, we suppose CRRq[i, j] = 0 or
1, with the luminance level of 0 or 255.
Algorithm 9: Batch decryption of color images
Input:m+ 1 cipher-grids CRq = {CRq[i, j]|CRq[i, j] =
{CRRq[i, j], CRGp [i, j], CRBp[i, j]|CRRp[i, j], CRGp [i, j], CRBp[i, j] ∈
{0, 1}}}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and 0 ≤ q ≤ m.
Output:m superimposing images CSp = {CSp[i, j]|CSp[i, j] =
{CSRp[i, j], CSGp [i, j], CSBp[i, j]|CSRp[i, j], CSGp [i, j], CSBp[i, j] ∈
[0 . . . 255]}}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ w, 1 ≤ j ≤ h, and 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
//Decomposition of cipher-grids
for (each pixel CRq[i, j]) do
(CRRq[i, j], CRGq [i, j], CRBq[i, j])
color component decomposition←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− CRq[i, j]
//Superimposition of cipher-grids
for (each CSRp, CS
G
p , CS
B
p) do
{CSRp = (255− CRRp−1)× (255− CRRp)/255
CSGp = (255− CRGp−1)× (255− CRGp )/255
CSBp = (255− CRBp−1)× (255− CRBp)/255}
//Composition of color components of stacked images
for (each pixel of CSp[i, j]) do
CSp[i, j] color component composition←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (CSRp[i, j], CSGp [i, j],
CSBp[i, j])
outputm superimposing images CSp
Prior to demonstrating the security and quality of the color
random grid chain, some definitions are given.
Definition 4 (Color Light Transmission). For a certain color grid
pixel, CR[i, j] = rc = (rc,R, rc,G, rc,B), in a color randomgrid, CR,
the color light transmission of a transparent pixel is defined as
t(rc) = (t(rc,R), t(rc,G), t(rc,B)) = (1, 1, 1). Likewise, the color
light transmission of a colored pixel is defined as:
t(rc) = (t(rc,R), t(rc,G), t(rc,B))
=

(0, 1, 1) for red color
(1, 0, 1) for green color
(1, 1, 0) for blue color
(0, 0, 1) for yellow color
(0, 1, 0) for magenta color
(1, 0, 0) for cyan color
(0, 0, 0) for black color.
With Definition 4, we have the average color light transmis-
sion below.
Definition 5 (Average Color Light Transmission). For a certain
color grid, CR = {rci |rci = (rc,Ri , rc,Gi , rc,Bi ), rc,Ri , rc,Gi , rc,Bi is
transparent or colored as red, green, blue, respectively}, the
average color light transmission of CR is defined as:
T (CR) = T (CRR, CRG, CRB)
= T

1
n
n
i=1
t(rc,Ri ),
1
n
n
i=1
t(rc,Gi ),
1
n
n
i=1
t(rc,Bi )

.
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Figure 3: Binary images X1 to X8 .Theorem 7 (Security). The proposed scheme in Algorithm 8 is as
secure as Kafri and Keren’s random grid scheme in Algorithm 3.
Proof. Let rci be one color random grid pixel of CRi, and b
c
i be
one pixel of HC i.
As shown in line 90 of Algorithm 8, the value of ‘‘0’’ or
‘‘1’’ is randomly generated by a coin-flip function. Thus, the
respective value of the color average light transmission of the
corresponding area in CR0, with respect to the white (resp.
black) area in the secret image, HC1, is regarded as:
T (CR0[HC1(0)]) = T (CRR0[HC1(0)], CRG0 [HC1(0)], CRB0[HC1(0)])
= (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)
(resp. T (CR0[HC1(1)]) = T (CRR0[HC1(1)], CRG0 [HC1(1)], CRB0[HC1(1)]) = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)) by Definition 5. With CR0 alone,
CR0 is visually meaningless for zero contrast.
To generate the second random grid, CR1, according to CR0
and G1, the operations in lines 110–140 of Algorithm 8 are
performed as the proof in Theorem 1, we also obtain that
the expected values of the average color light transmission,
T (CR1[HC1(0)]) and T (CR1[HC1(1)]), are (1/2,1/2,1/2). By
Definition 3, CR1 is visually meaningless; the contrast is 0.
The processes in lines 110–140 are repeated to generate
the other random grids, CRi, based on CRi−1 and HC i, where
i = 2, 3, . . . ,m. Hence, the expected values of the average
color light transmission, T (CRi[HC i(0)]) and T (CRi[HC i(1)]), are
(1/2,1/2,1/2). To sum up, each random grid alone reveals no
information of the secrets. 
For the scenario of encrypting color images, the contrast
refers to the visual quality of the stacked result, CSp = CRp−1⊕
CRp. Definition 3 is suitable for analyzing the visual quality of
each color component in Algorithm 9.
Theorem 8 (Quality). The contrast of the proposed scheme
in Algorithm 9 is the same as that of Kafri and Keren’s
corresponding random grid scheme. Thus, the quality of all stacked
images, CSp (p = 1, 2, . . . ,m), is acceptable so that the secrets
are visually recognizable.
Proof. This proof aims to show T (CSxp[HCxp(0)]) > T (CSxp
[HCxp(1)]), where CSxp = CRxp−1 ⊕ CRxp, p = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and
x = R,G, B.If CRp−1 and CRp are stacked to form CSp = (CSRp, CSGp , CSBp),
CSxp[HCxp(0)] = CRxp−1[HCxp(0)] ⊕ CRxp[HCxp(0)] and CSxp[HCxp(1)]
= CRxp−1[HCxp(1)] ⊕ CRxp[HCxp(1)].
First, based on lines 90 and 120 of Algorithm 8, both CRxp−1
and CRxp are randomly generated under the case of HC
x
p(0).
From Lemma 2(b), T (CRxp−1[HCxp(0)] ⊕ CRxp[HCxp(0)]) = 1/4
is obtained. Thus, T (CSxp[HCxp(0)]) = T (CRxp−1[HCxp(0)] ⊕
CRxp[HCxp(0)]) = 1/4.
Second, according to line 140 of Algorithm 8, CRxp−1 and CR
x
p
are inverse under the case of HCxp(1). From Lemma 2(c),
T (CRxp−1[HCxp(1)] ⊕ CRxp[HCxp(1)]) = 0 is obtained. Thus,
T (CSxp[HCxp(1)]) = T (CRxp−1[HCxp(1)] ⊕ CRxp[HCxp(1)]) = 0.
The contrast, αxp, between CR
x
p−1 and CR
x
p is:
T (CSxp[HCxp(0)])− T (CSxp[HCxp(1)])
1+ T (CSxp[HCxp(1)])
=
1
4 − 0
1+ 0 =
1
4
> 0,
where CSxp = CRxp−1 ⊕ CRxp, p = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and x = R,G, B.
The quality of the stacked image, CSp, is acceptable to be visually
recognizable, since the contrast is greater than 0. 
4. Experimental results and discussions
Encryption/decryption experiments were conducted to
demonstrate the feasibility of the presented batch image
encryption schemes. Eight binary images of size 100 ×
100 pixels (in Figure 3(a)–(h)), have been encrypted. The
random grid, R0, is first randomly generated, as shown in
Figure 4(a). The binary images, X1 to X8, are encrypted
into the other eight cipher-grids, R1 to R8, respectively
(Figure 4(b)–(i)). In the decryption phase, the images, S1 to S8,
(Figure 5(a)–(h)) are obtainedby stacking (R0, R1), (R1, R2), . . . ,
and so on. The proposed scheme is extended to suitably deal
with grey-level and color images. The further experimental
results are demonstrated as follows. Assume there are four
grey-level images, G1 to G4, of size 256 × 256 pixels
(Figure 6(a)–(d)), and corresponding halftone images, HG1 to
HG4, (Figure 7(a)–(d)). In the encryption phase, the cipher-
grids,HR0 toHR4, are generated (Figure 8(a)–(e)). The decrypted
images, HS1 to HS4, are shown in Figure 9(a)–(d). In the same
way, four color images, C1 to C4, of size 256 × 256 pixels
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(g) R6 . (h) R7 . (i) R8 .
Figure 4: Cipher-grids R0 to R8 .(a) S1 . (b) S2 . (c) S3 . (d) S4 .
(e) S5 . (f) S6 . (g) S7 . (h) S8 .
Figure 5: Stacked images S1 to S8 .(a) G1 . (b) G2 . (c) G3 . (d) G4 .
Figure 6: Grey-level images G1 to G4 .(a) HG1 . (b) HG2 . (c) HG3 . (d) HG4 .
Figure 7: Halftone images HG1 to HG4 of G1 to G4 .
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Figure 8: Cipher-grids HR0 to HR4 .(a) HS1 . (b) HS2 . (c) HS3 . (d) HS4 .
Figure 9: Decrypted images HS1 to HS4 .(a) C1 . (b) C2 . (c) C3 . (d) C4 .
Figure 10: Color images C1 to C4 .(a) CR0 . (b) CR1 . (c) CR2 . (d) CR3 . (e) CR4 .
Figure 11: Color cipher-grids CR0 to CR4 .(a) CS1 . (b) CS2 . (c) CS3 . (d) CS4 .
Figure 12: Decrypted images CS1 to CS4 .(Figure 10(a)–(d)), are encoded into the color cipher-grids, CR0
to CR4 (Figure 11(a)–(e)); the decrypted images, CS1 to CS4, are
shown in Figure 12(a)–(d). All experiments were conducted on
an IBM personal computer with a Pentium IV 3.4 GHz CPU with
2 GB memory under Windows XP.
Generally, the sizes of the secret images are assumed
identical. If not, in reality, the pre-process is needed to adjustthem. One of the following operations may be done:
(1) Concatenate and divide: All secret images are first spatially
concatenated and then divided non-overlapped with the
same size. The information of original sizes must be shared
with recipients additionally.
(2) Padding: Individual images are padded with noise to form
the ones with the same size as that of the maximum.
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Kafri and
Keren [9]
Naor and
Shamir [10]
Lukac and
Plataniotis [19]
Shyu [20] Barrera et al. [27,28] The proposed
schemes
Encryption method Random grid Visual
cryptography
Visual
cryptography
Random grid Optics system Random grid
Need codebook No Yes Yes No No No
Pixel expansion No Yes Yes No No No
Quality Recognizable Recognizable Recognizable Recognizable Recognizable Recognizable
Image format Binary Binary Binary grey-level
Color
Binary
grey-level Color
Binary Binary grey-level
Color
Implementation cost Low Low Low Low High Low
Hardware support Transparency Transparency Computation-
based
Transparency CCD, Collimator,
beam splitter, lens
et al.
Transparency or
Computation-based
The number of cipher
images form secret images
2m 2ma 2mb 2m 2m m+ 1
a, b: These two parameters are roughly 4m if considering pixel expansion of visual cryptography.Further discussions
(1) Generalization: Compared with the works in [9,20], the
proposed schemes are suitable for dealing with binary,
grey-level, color images by image batch-encryption.
(2) Computation cost: In the encryption phase, while the
computation cost of theOR-operation involved is extremely
light, the main cost comes from the operation of coin-flip
functions. There are two cases in the decryption phase. One
is that no computation cost is required if the participant
stacks two transparencies (cipher-grids) to disclose the
secret. The other is that only a lightweight OR-operation is
adopted to recover the secret if any computation device is
involved.
(3) Bandwidth and storage complexity: For the above-mentioned
random-grid encryption schemes, in order to encrypt m
images, the number of cipher-grids is expanded to 2m,
which is not efficient. The proposed schemes of chaining
random grids only generate m + 1 cipher-grids. The more
images encrypted, the higher performancewe gain in terms
of storage and bandwidth saving.
The related methods are compared with the proposed
schemes in terms of functionalities and performance (Table 4).
Obviously, in addition to the above mentioned analysis, the
present schemes have another three advantages.
(1) No codebook required: Compared with traditional visual
cryptography, transmission andmanagement of codebooks
are not required to save the cost of certain applications.
(2) No pixel expansion: One of the main areas of research of
visual cryptography is that it suffers from pixel expansion.
Fortunately, the size of cipher-grids is identical to that of
secret images.
(3) Easy to use and simple to implement: To disclose the secret,
the participant simply stacks two transparencies and rec-
ognizes the content of the decrypted image. Furthermore,
unlike some related schemes, [28,36], by adopting an op-
tics system to encryptmultiple binary images, the proposed
schemes do not only involve extremely low computation,
but are also simple to implement without the requirement
of expensive hardware.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a novel image batch encryption scheme,
based on chaining random grids has been proposed, profiting
from efficiency and simple implementation, by disclosing thesecret by a human visual system superimposed upon the
cipher images. Compared with the existing related random-
grid-based schemes, encryptingm images just generatesm+ 1
cipher images instead of 2m. As a result, the present schemes
have practical advantages in bandwidth and storage saving. In
contrast with the existing related visual-cryptography-based
schemes, no pixel expansion is involved and the overhead of
a skillfully designed codebook is removed. Since the decryption
process is much faster than that of the encryption process, the
proposed schemes are particularly suitable for a scenario in
which clientswith lightweight computation capability shoulder
the role of decrypting the cipher-grids.
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